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ISLAM AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE EXPERIENCE 
OF RELIGIOUS MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES 
Brett G. Scharffs* 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most interesting stories in the history of religious freedom is the 
journey of the Catholic Church, from being perhaps the most powerful institution on 
earth opposed to religious freedom in the eighteenth and into the nineteenth 
centuries, to being perhaps the most powerful institution on earth in defense of 
religious freedom from the middle of the twentieth century and into the early decades 
of the twenty-first century.
1
  Whereas in most countries today there is a very high 
correlation between dominant religious majorities and a low degree of religious 
freedom, regardless of whether the religious majority is Orthodox Christian, 
Muslim, Buddhist, Jewish, or Hindu, there is a striking exception: in countries with 
large Catholic majorities, limitations on religious freedom—measured both in terms 
of legal restrictions and social hostilities—tend to be low or very low.
2
 
In an article in the Notre Dame Law Review celebrating the fiftieth anniversary 
of Dignitatis Humanae, I documented this remarkable anomaly and suggested that 
this was due to the Catholic Church’s journey toward finding within its own religious 
tradition the theological resources for identifying freedom of religion as a basic 
component of human dignity and thus a fundamental human right.
3
  In a subsequent 
article, Andrea Pin (whose article Is There a Place for Islam in the West? 
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Adjudicating the Muslim Headscarf in Europe and the United States
4
 is the catalyst 




An important factor in the emergence of religious freedom as a core doctrine 
of the Catholic Church was an increased appreciation within the Church of the 
experience of Catholics in countries, such as the United States, where Catholics are 
a minority rather than a majority of the population.
6
  As John Courtney Murray and 
other American Catholic thinkers explained to their coreligionists, religious freedom 
was very good for the Catholic Church in a place such as the United States where, 
while the largest single denomination, Catholics represented only about a quarter of 
the population and were minorities in a country where Protestants were the 
majority.
7
  The history of the Catholic experience in America—a journey from being 
a minority that suffered persecution and discrimination on account of religion to 
being an accepted and ordinary part of the country’s religious landscape—had a 
profound influence on Vatican thinking about religious freedom.
8
 
Professor Andrea Pin’s article, Is There a Place for Islam in the West? 
Adjudicating the Muslim Headscarf in Europe and the United States, raises a related 
question.  The article contrasts recent court cases involving Islamic headscarves in 
workplace settings, and notes that in the United States, the freedom to manifest one’s 
faith by wearing a headscarf has been generally protected, whereas in Europe in two 
recent cases the Court of Justice of the European Union declined to protect such 
religious manifestations.
9
  The question raised is how the treatment of religious 
freedom claims made by Muslims in places where Islam is a minority religion may 
affect the trajectory of thinking about religious freedom in what is often called the 
“Muslim world”—countries where Islam is not just the majority, but also the 
overwhelmingly dominant religion. 
The concern animating this contribution is that failing to protect the religious 
freedom rights of Muslims in places where Islam is a minority religion will make it 
more difficult for Islam, as the second largest of the world’s religions,
10
 to embrace 
a vision of religious freedom in places where it is a majority. 
There are, of course, good reasons for thinking that the journey of Islam from 
a religious institution that is powerfully opposed to religious freedom into one that 
is supportive of religious freedom will not follow the same road as that traveled by 
 
 4 Andrea Pin, Is There a Place for Islam in the West?  Adjudicating the Muslim Headscarf 
in Europe and the United States, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2017). 
 5 See Brett G. Scharffs & Andrea Pin, Freedom for All: The Catholic Journey to Religious 
Freedom and its Global Legacy (Sept. 9, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Notre Dame 
Law Review Online).  Some of the information in Parts II and III of this Essay are adapted from 
Freedom for All. 
 6 See id. 
 7 See id. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See generally Pin, supra note 4. 
 10 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE: A REPORT ON THE SIZE 
AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD’S MAJOR RELIGIOUS GROUPS AS OF 2010 9 (Dec. 2012) 
[hereinafter THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE], 
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2014/01/global-religion-full.pdf.   
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the Catholic Church.  For one thing, Islam is much more diffuse as an “institution” 
than the Catholic Church is, so even knowing who has the authority to speak on 




Nevertheless, it seems likely that change in Islam will be affected both by 
outside and internal sources, as was the case for the Catholic Church and its journey 
to Dignitatis Humanae.  However, one thing the Catholic experience suggests is that 
meaningful and profound change does not simply come from outside pressures; it 
comes from authentic and sincere evaluation and interpretation by insiders of a 
religious tradition of that tradition itself.  Thus, if Islam is going to come to embrace 
religious freedom as an important value, this will be the result, significantly if not 
primarily, of Muslims interpreting their own sacred texts, histories, traditions, and 
legal systems. 
Is such a journey possible or likely? 
I.     SETTING THE STAGE 
Despite the long history of religious freedom as a human right, laws throughout 
the world vary widely in protecting freedom of religion and belief.  Restrictions on 
religious freedom are a global problem whose ramifications can cause social unrest 
throughout the world, perhaps especially in Muslim countries.  One of the key tenets 
of Islam is proselytism, and so within Islam conversion to the religion is 
unambiguously encouraged.
12
  Nevertheless, in some countries where the majority 
of people are Muslim, conversion from Islam to another religion is strictly 
forbidden.
13
  However, while several Muslim-majority countries have enacted laws 
greatly favoring Muslim citizens to the detriment of non-Muslim citizens, other 
Muslim-majority countries do not regulate worship.
14
 
The heterogeneity of positions regarding religious freedom in Muslim 
countries may be attributed to a wide variety of factors such as the existence of 
different branches of Islam
15
 and the absence of stable recognized religious 
hierarchies within Islam.
16
  Some Muslims may quote the Quran to show Islam’s 
support for religious freedom, saying, “[t]here shall be no compulsion in [acceptance 
of] the religion,”
17
 and, “Say, O disbelievers.  I do not worship what you worship.  
 
 11 See infra Part I.  
 12 See QURAN, sura An-Nahl 16:125 (“Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good 
instruction . . . .”). 
 13 See Angelina E. Theodorou, Which Countries Still Outlaw Apostasy and Blasphemy?, PEW 
RES. CTR. (July 29, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/29/which-countries-
still-outlaw-apostasy-and-blasphemy/. 
 14 See PEW RES. CTR., MANY COUNTRIES FAVOR SPECIFIC RELIGIONS, OFFICIALLY OR 
UNOFFICIALLY  (Oct. 3, 2017), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/11/2017/09/29162847/FULL-REPORT-FOR-WEB.pdf.  
 15 See Amber Pariona, The Major Branches of Islam, WORLD ATLAS (Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-major-branches-of-islam.html (describing and 
distinguishing five branches of Islam).  
 16 See Dr. Hatem al-Haj, Religious Hierarchy in Islam, ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM JURISTS OF 
AM. (Aug. 6, 2006), http://www.amjaonline.org/fatwa-1670/info.  
 17 QURAN, sura Al-Baqarah 2:256 (second alteration in original). 
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Nor are you worshipers of what I worship. . . . For you is your religion, and for me 
is my religion.”
18
  But others quote from the Prophet al-Bukhari—“the Prophet said, 
‘If somebody (a Muslim) discards his religion, kill him’”
19
—to justify suppression 
of religious freedom.  Consequently, despite the fact that some Muslims are strong 
advocates of religious freedom, Muslim-majority countries are usually more 
restrictive in matters of religious freedom than the rest of the world.
20
 
To understand the prospects for religious freedom within Islamic thinking, it 
is helpful to get a better sense of the current state of affairs. 
II.     RELIGIOUS MAJORITIES AND RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE 
CATHOLIC ANOMALY 
In April 2017, the Pew Research Forum reported that 40% of the world’s 
countries (based on 2015 data) had high or very high overall restrictions on religious 
freedom, an increase from 34% in 2014, with 60% having moderate or low 
restrictions on religious freedom.
21
  Because the countries with high or very high 
restrictions include some with very large populations, such as India and China, these 
countries include nearly four out of every five people (79%) in the world.  Only 21% 
of the world’s population live in countries with moderate or low restrictions on 
religious freedom, a decrease from 26% in 2014.
22
 
A large majority of the countries with high or very high legal or social 
restrictions on religion are places where the largest religious group represents either 




A.   Legal Restrictions on Religious Freedom 
There is a high correlation between countries with high or very high legal 
restrictions on religious freedom and countries where the dominant religious 
majority group represents a supermajority of more than 70% of the population of 
 
 18 QURAN, sura Al-Kafirun 109:1–6. 
 19 MUHAMMAD AL-BUKHARI, SAHIH AL-BUKHARI vol. 4, bk. 52, no. 260. 
 20 See Scharffs, supra note 1, at 1423, 1425. 
 21 PEW RESEARCH CTR., GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE MODESTLY IN 2015, 




 22 Id. at 14.  The percentage for high and very high restrictions are taken from page 14 of this 
report.  Id. at 14.  The percentages for moderate and low restrictions are not specifically mentioned 
in the report but are simply what remains.  As the percentage for high and very high restrictions 
increased by 5% from 2014 to 2015 (74% to 79%), the percentage for moderate and low restrictions 
on religious freedom has subsequently decreased by 5%.  See id. at 14–15. 
 23 See THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–50 (providing religious 
composition of various countries).  For an overview of the sources of Pew’s demographic data, see 
GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, at 38–41.  Primary sources “include 
reports from U.S. government agencies, several independent, nongovernmental organizations and 
a variety of European and United Nations bodies.”  Id. at 38–39. 
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that country.
24
  In the April 2017 Pew Report, there were twenty-three countries with 
very high and twenty-seven countries with high government/legal restrictions on 
religious freedom.
25
  Eighteen of the twenty-three countries with very high legal 
restrictions have a dominant religious group of over 70%.
26
  Many of these countries 
have a Muslim supermajority, but there is also one country with an Orthodox 
Christian supermajority (Russia).
27
  Of the remaining five countries with very high 
legal restrictions, the dominant religious group represents more than half of the 
population in two: Eritrea and Malaysia.
28
 
Twenty-three of the twenty-seven countries with high legal restrictions have a 
dominant religious group of 70% of the population or higher.
29
  This list is again 
dominated by countries with a Muslim supermajority, but there is also a smattering 
of countries with Christian, Hindu, Jewish, or Buddhist supermajorities.
30
  Of the 
remaining four countries with high legal restrictions, the dominant religious group 
represents more than 60% of the population in three of them.
31
 
These correlations are striking.  Of the fifty countries with high or very high 
legal restrictions, forty-one have a dominant religious group of 70% or more of the 
population, and five of the remaining nine have a dominant religious group of 60% 
or more of the population.
32
  In all, forty-six of fifty countries with high or very high 
legal restrictions have a dominant religious group representing more than 60% of 
 
 24 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50 (listing countries 
with high and very high government restrictions on religion). 
 25 See id.  
 26 Id. at 15, app. A at 50; THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–50 
(providing the religious composition of various countries). 
 27 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, at 15, app. A at 50 (listing 
countries with very high government restrictions on religion); THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS 
LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–50 (providing the religious composition of various countries).  
Note that the data for Russia from this report were “[e]stimates based on [the] 2004 Generations 
and Gender Survey, adjusted to account for underrepresented religious and projected to 2010.”  Id. 
at 78.  More recent estimates are that between 42.5% and 68% of Russian are Orthodox Christians, 
with several other Christian denominations at less than 5% each.  See, e.g., BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RUSSIA 2014 INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2 (2014), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238638.pdf 
(reporting various studies and surveys). 
 28 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, at 15, app. A at 50; THE 
GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 46, 48 (providing the religious composition of 
China, Eritrea, and Malaysia).  China’s dominant religious group is technically unaffiliated with 
52.2% of the population.  Id. at 46. 
 29 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50 (outlining 
countries with high legal restrictions); THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–
50 (providing the religious composition of different countries) 
 30 See id. 
 31 See GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50 (listing Qatar, 
Laos, France, and Cuba as four of the twenty-seven countries with high government restrictions); 
THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 46–47, 49 (providing that the dominant 
religion accounts for more than 60% of the population in Qatar, Laos, and France). 
 32 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50 (listing countries 
with very high and high government restrictions on religion). 
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the population.
33
  Only four countries with high or very high restrictions (Cuba, 
China, Singapore, and Vietnam) are countries where the dominant religious group 
is less than 60% of the population.
34
 
B.   Social Hostilities Involving Religion 
A similar pattern is evident in countries with very high or high social hostilities 
involving religion and the existence of a majority religious group.  According to the 
2017 Pew Report, there are eleven countries with very high social hostilities 
involving religion, and forty-two countries with high social hostilities.
35
  There is 
significant, but not absolute, overlap between countries with high or very high legal 
restrictions and countries with high or very high social hostilities.
36
 
Ten of the eleven countries with very high social hostilities have a dominant 
religious group representing 70% or more of the population.
37
  As we might expect, 
this includes a number of Muslim-majority countries, but also countries with a Hindu 
majority (India), a Jewish majority (Israel), and an Orthodox Christian majority 
(Russia).
38
  Of the countries with very high social hostilities, only Nigeria does not 
have a majority religious group of over 50%, and that country is almost evenly 
divided between a Muslim-dominated northern half of the country and a Christian-
dominated southern half of the country, with the overall population of the country 




 33 See id.  
 34 See GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50; THE GLOBAL 
RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 46, 49–50.  Note that the Pew data for Cuba, placing the 
“Mixed Christian” total for the country at 59.2%, is an “estimate[] based on [the] 2010 World 
Religion Database.”  Id. at 46, 72.  Other sources, however, give a higher total.  The Roman Catholic 
Church, for example, estimates that 60% to 70% of the population of Cuba is Catholic (though 
admittedly the number actually attending mass is much lower, perhaps as low as 4% to 5% of 
nominal Catholics).  See Geoff Thale, Comunidades de Fe en Cuba: Primera Parte de la Serie de 
Fondo de WOLA Sobre la Religión en Cuba, WOLA (Mar. 26, 2012), 
http://www.wola.org/es/comentario/comunidades_de_fe_en_cuba_primera_parte_de_la_serie_de
_fondo_de_wola_sobre_la_religion_en.  However, “[t]here is no independent, authoritative source 
on the overall size or composition of religious groups” in this Communist-controlled country.  
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CUBA 2014 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 1 (2014), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238748.pdf (providing data on Cuba). 
 35 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53 (listing countries 
with high and very high social hostilities). 
 36 See id. app. A at 50, app. B at 53. 
 37 Id. app. B at 53 (listing countries with very high social hostilities); THE GLOBAL 
RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–50 (providing the religious composition of different 
countries).   
 38 Id. 
 39 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53 (listing Nigeria as 
a country with very high social hostilities); THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, 
at 48 (providing the religious composition of Nigeria).  The 2012 Pew Report (citing 2010 data) 
reported that Nigeria was almost evenly divided between Christians (49.3%) and Muslims (48.8%).  
See id.  According to the U.S. State Department Report for 2014, “[m]ost observers estimate 
approximately 50 percent of the population is Muslim and 50 percent Christian.”  BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, NIGERIA 2014 INTERNATIONAL 
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There is also a very strong correlation between high social hostilities and 
countries where the dominant religious group is a majority or supermajority.  Thirty-
three of the forty-two countries with high social hostilities have a dominant religious 
group with 70% or more of the population.
40
  Of the remaining nine countries with 
high social hostilities involving religion, all have a dominant religious group with 
50% or more of the population.
41
 
These correlations once again are striking.  Of the fifty-three countries with 
high or very high social hostilities, forty-three have a dominant religious group of 
70% or more of the population, and eight of the remaining ten have a dominant 
religious group of 60% or more of the population.
42
  In all, fifty-one of fifty-three 
countries with high or very high social hostilities relating to religion have a dominant 
religious group representing more than 60% of the population.
43
  Only two countries 
(Nigeria and Bosnia and Herzegovina) with high or very high social hostilities have 
a dominant religious group that is less than 60% of the population.
44
 
These statistics incline toward the conclusion that where there is a large 
religious majority or supermajority this will almost always correlate with high or 
very high legal and social restrictions on religion.  But this is not the case, for there 
is an important exception: the Catholic Church.  Countries where the dominant 
religious group is Catholic are noteworthy for their low legal restrictions as well as 
low social hostilities regarding religion.
45
 
C.   The Catholic Anomaly 
Of the countries included in the Pew research, there are thirty-two countries 
where Catholics represent a supermajority of 70% or more of the population.
46
  In 
none of these thirty-two countries are there high or very high legal restrictions on 
 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2 (2014), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238460.pdf. 
 40 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53 (listing the 
countries with high social hostilities); THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–
50 (providing the religious composition of different countries). 
 41 GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53; THE GLOBAL 
RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–49.  The religious balance in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is approximately 52% Christian and 45% Muslim.  Id. at 45. 
 42 See GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53; THE GLOBAL 
RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–49.   
 43 See GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53; THE GLOBAL 
RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–49.   
 44 See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
 45 See GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53; THE GLOBAL 
RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–49.   
 46 PEW RESEARCH CTR., TABLE: CHRISTIAN POPULATION AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL 
POPULATION BY COUNTRY (Dec. 19, 2011) [hereinafter CHRISTIAN POPULATION TABLE], 
http://www.pewforum.org/2011/12/19/table-christian-population-as-percentages-of-total-
population-by-country/ (providing the Christian composition of different countries’ populations).  
The Pew studies, using “censuses, surveys and official population registers,” are based on self-
identification of believers.  THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 7.  They do 
“not attempt to measure the degree to which members of these groups actively practice their faiths 
or how religious they are.”  Id. at 15. 
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religious freedom.
47
  Thirteen (Argentina, Austria, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, 
Italy, Mexico, Monaco, Panama, Peru, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, and Venezuela) of 
the thirty-two countries with a Catholic supermajority have moderate legal 
restrictions, and the remaining nineteen have low legal restrictions.
48
  Thus, while 
eighteen of the twenty-three countries with very high legal restrictions on religion 
have a dominant religious group with 70% or more of the population,
49
 none of those 
countries has a Catholic supermajority or Catholic majority.  And while twenty-three 
of the twenty-seven countries with high legal restrictions have a dominant religious 
group of 70% or more,
50
 none of those countries has a Catholic supermajority, and 
only two (Cuba and France) have a Catholic majority.
51
 
The Catholic attitude toward minorities is not confined to the legal realm.  Of 
the thirty-two countries where Catholics represent more than 70% of the population, 
none are countries where social hostilities involving religion are very high, and in 
only four (Italy, Mexico, Slovakia, and the Philippines) are social hostilities high.
52
  
Social hostilities are moderate in eight and low in twenty of the thirty-two countries 
with a Catholic supermajority.
53
  Therefore, in the thirty-two countries with a 
Catholic supermajority, there are zero with very high social hostilities and only four 
with high social hostilities.
 
 
Thus, while ten of the eleven countries with very high social hostilities toward 
religion have a dominant religious group representing 70% or more of the 
population,
54
 none of those countries has a Catholic supermajority.  And while thirty-
three out of forty-two countries with high social hostilities toward religion have a 
dominant religious group with 70% or more of the population, only four of those 
thirty-three countries (Italy, Mexico, Slovakia, and the Philippines) have a Catholic 
supermajority.
55
  And while the remaining nine countries with high social 
restrictions on religion have a dominant religious group representing between 50% 




This data suggests two interim conclusions.  The first, which draws from the 
statistics showing that religious majorities tend to oppress religious minorities either 
 
 47 See GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50; CHRISTIAN 
POPULATION TABLE, supra note 46. 
 48 See CHRISTIAN POPULATION TABLE, supra note 46; GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION 
RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50–51  (rating countries’ legal restrictions on religion). 
 49 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 50 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 51 See CHRISTIAN POPULATION TABLE, supra note 46; GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION 
RISE, supra note 21, app. A at 50. 
 52 See CHRISTIAN POPULATION TABLE, supra note 46; GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION 
RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53. 
 53 See CHRISTIAN POPULATION TABLE, supra note 46; GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION 
RISE, supra note 21, app. B at 53  AT 
 54 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 55 See supra notes 42 and 48 and accompanying text. 
 56 See CHRISTIAN POPULATION TABLE, supra note 46 (providing that the Catholic 
composition of France is 60.4%); GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION RISE, supra note 21, app. 
B at 53; THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 10, at 45–49; see also supra notes 32 
and 44 and accompanying text. 
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or both through legislation and societal restrictions, is that religion itself may be an 
important category of limitation on religious freedom.  A second interim conclusion, 
which draws from the quite exceptional data concerning Catholic majority countries’ 
attitudes toward minorities, is that it may be within religious traditions themselves 
that we will find the most effective resources for defending religious freedom. 
III.     THE CATHOLIC CHURCH’S VIEWS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE PRE-
VATICAN II ERA 
The Catholic Church as an institution has not always protected religious 
freedom for all; it has taken a long journey toward embracing the ideal of religious 
freedom regardless of faith.
57
  The Catholic Church’s historical trajectory shows that 
religions can change and may come to embrace religious freedom in a way that 
positively affects everybody, by reflecting upon their own doctrine. 
Catholicism came to protect religious freedom late in modernity.  The topic of 
religious freedom had been widely known to the Catholic Church, as the Christian 
faith was persecuted from its very beginning.
58
  But the Catholic doctrine had 
developed to the extent that, writing in 1791 at the time of the French Revolution, 
Pope Pius VI viewed religious freedom as an assault on the Catholic Church, calling 
it a “monstrous right” and an “imaginary dream[].”
59
 
The sharp critique of religious freedom was continued by Pope Gregory XVI’s 
1832 encyclical Mirari Vos, which denounced religious freedom as leading to 
“indifferentism” toward truth, stating, “[t]his shameful font of indifferentism gives 
rise to that absurd and erroneous proposition which claims that liberty of conscience 
must be maintained for everyone.”
60
  For Pope Gregory XVI, religious liberty led to 
the false conclusion that one religion is as good as any other.
61
 
A little over a decade later, in 1844, Pope Gregory XVI denounced Bible 
societies that translated and distributed the Bible in vernacular languages, warning 
about “indifference to religion propagated by the sect members under the name of 
religious liberty.”
62
  He warned that if “complete liberty of conscience, as they call 
it, spreads among the Italian people, political liberty will result of its own accord.”
63
 
In 1864, Pope Pius IX issued his Syllabus Errorum (Syllabus of Errors),
64
 
which included denunciations of indifferentism, communism, Bible societies, and 
 
 57 See Scharffs, supra note 1, at 1435–41. 
 58 See generally Everett Ferguson, Persecution in the Early Church: Did You Know?, IX 
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modern liberalism.  Pope Pius IX declared it an error that, “in some Catholic 
countries, that persons coming to reside therein shall enjoy the public exercise of 
their own peculiar worship.”
65
  Also an error was that the Pope ought to reconcile 
himself “and come to terms with progress, liberalism and modern civilization.”
66
 
In 1885, it was the turn of Pope Leo XIII.  With his encyclical Immortale Dei: 
On the Christian Constitution of States,
67
 Leo drew on previous papal 
pronouncements, advocated for a special place for the Catholic Church’s teaching 
in state laws, and repudiated religious freedom.  He stated that “it [was] not lawful 
for the State, any more than for the individual, either to disregard all religious duties 
or to hold in equal favour different kinds of religion.”
68
  More generally, he also 
argued that “unrestrained freedom of thinking and of openly making known one’s 
thoughts [was] not inherent in the rights of citizens, and [was] by no means to be 
reckoned worthy of favour and support.”
69
 
In 1892, Pope Leo XIII also warned Catholics not to fraternize with 
Freemasons, namely “those who hide under the mask of universal tolerance, respect 
for all religions, and the craving to reconcile the maxims of the Gospel with those of 
the revolution.”
70
  In 1900, he reiterated this theme by declaring, “[t]he world has 




IV.     U.S. ANTI-CATHOLICISM AND THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A CATHOLIC 
DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
Meanwhile, during much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
Catholics suffered discrimination and even persecution in the United States.
72
  Some 
of the first major anti-Catholic outbursts occurred in the Northeast of the United 
States from the 1830s to the 1850s, leading to the burning of Catholic property and 
the killing of Catholics.
73
  Much of the violence and the anti-Catholic sentiments 
were fed by claims that Catholics were destroying the culture of the United States.  
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Irish Catholic immigrants were blamed for spreading violence and drunkenness.
74
  
Prominent Protestant leaders attacked the Catholic Church as theologically unsound 
and an enemy of republican values.
75
  The Catholic Church’s official silence on the 




In the 1920s, anti-Catholicism was widespread in the United States.
77
  The Ku 
Klux Klan considered Catholicism to be incompatible with democracy and that 
parochial schools encouraged a separatism that kept Catholics from being loyal 
Americans.
78
  With the rapid growth of the second Ku Klux Klan, anti-Catholic 
rhetoric intensified.
79
  On August 11, 1921, Father James E. Coyle was killed on his 
rectory porch in Birmingham, Alabama, by a Southern Methodist minister, Rev. 
Edwin R. Stephenson.
80
  The murder occurred just hours after Coyle had performed 
a wedding between Stephenson’s daughter, Ruth, and Pedro Gussman, a Puerto 
Rican immigrant.
81
  Several months before the wedding, Ruth had enraged her father 
by converting to Roman Catholicism.
82
  Stephenson was defended by Hugo Black, 
a future Justice of the Supreme Court.
83
  In Alabama, Hugo Black was elected to the 
U.S. Senate in 1926 after building a political base partially through his delivery of 




The Jesuit theologian John Courtney Murray became cognizant of that anti-
Catholic fear.
85
  He realized the existence of understandable mistrust of motives that 
many Americans had about the quickly growing American Catholic community.
86
  
Therefore, Murray began to develop a view based on the American view of a 
separation of church and state.
87
  He developed the view of a religion-state 
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framework where a government limited by laws protects the liberty of all religious 
communities equally, while the church pursues its aims by exercising its influence 
in society without relying on government intervention to enforce the church’s 
status.
88
  Consequently, by the 1950s,  
Murray had written innovatively on the way the Catholic Church should interact 
with the state (or, as he preferred to call it, the government).  As a public 
intellectual Murray had also been deeply engaged in debates with Protestant and 
secular opinion-makers about the religious role of Catholicism in U.S. public life.  
Catholics had long been held in suspicion by these opinion-makers, who feared 




Furthermore, Murray’s work  
also addressed the internal reflection of the Catholic community on religious 
freedom.  This line of thinking surely had greater personal cost for Murray 
because of the initial response of Church leadership to his thinking.  In the end, 
however, Murray’s theology helped bring about an extraordinary shift in the 
Catholic Church’s stance toward religious freedom.  Murray argued that attention 
to the historical contexts of the rejection of religious freedom by nineteenth 
century popes such as Pius IX and Leo XIII could enable the Church to affirm 




He helped the Church Fathers develop an understanding of freedom that did 
not contradict the Catholic Church’s claim to carry the truth.
91
  He was also able to 
provide a historical perspective on the development of the Catholic doctrine of 
religious freedom that avoided frictions between the bold affirmations of Dignitatis 
Humanae and the nineteenth century’s quite different approach to the topic.
92
 
V.     VATICAN II 
On December 7, 1965, His Holiness Pope Paul VI promulgated Dignitatis 
Humanae: On the Right of the Person and of Communities to Social Civil Freedom 
in Matters Religious.
93
  The declaration begins by noting that: 
A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself more and 
more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man, and the demand is 
increasingly made that men should act on their own judgment, enjoying and 
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The Second Vatican Ecumenical Council (“the Council”) declared the demand 
for freedom of religion to be “greatly in accord with truth and justice.”
95
  The 
declaration self-consciously searched “into the sacred tradition and doctrine of the 
Church—the treasury out of which the Church continually brings forth new things 
that are in harmony with the things that are old.”
96
  Thus, the declaration sought to 
find within the Catholic tradition and doctrine, the doctrines and resources that 
support the idea of freedom of religion.
97
  The Council noted that “all men are bound 
to seek the truth, especially in what concerns God and His Church, and to embrace 
the truth they come to know, and to hold fast to it.”
98
  But such obligations fall to 
human conscience.
99
  “The truth cannot impose itself except by virtue of its own 
truth, as it makes its entrance into the mind at once quietly and with power.”
100
  
Religious freedom, in turn, demands that men be permitted “to fulfill their duty to 
worship God . . . with immunity from coercion in civil society.”
101
  Thus, the 
doctrine of religious freedom does not undermine “traditional Catholic doctrine on 




Vatican II recognized that the truth exists in harmony with religious 
freedom.
103
  Therefore,  
[r]eligious freedom does not imply indifferentism, but rather creates a sphere of 
personal responsibility wherein human beings can pursue the truth free from 
physical and psychological coercion.  Dignitatis Humanae is designed both to 
appeal to public reason and to be rooted in the doctrinal understandings of true 
Catholic faith.  The understanding of human dignity becomes the wellspring from 
which this powerful defense of religious freedom emerges.
104
 
The Second Vatican Council signaled the culmination of a dramatic change in 
the Catholic Church’s perception of religious freedom.
105
  The right to religious 
freedom is now viewed by the Catholic Church “as having ‘its foundation in the 
dignity of the person.’”
106
  Furthermore, Catholics now view the doctrine of religious 
freedom as being rooted in divine revelation and as a Christian duty to respect it 
more conscientiously.
107
  This “[d]ivine revelation ‘gives evidence of the respect 
which Christ showed toward the freedom with which man is to fulfill his duty of 
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belief in the word of God and it gives us lessons in the spirit which disciples of . . . 
[Christ] ought to adopt and continually follow.’”
108
  Vatican II underlined the fact 




There are many factors that played a part in the Catholic Church’s journey to 
Vatican II and its doctrinal embrace of freedom of religion as a basic component of 
human dignity and as a fundamental human right.  Some of these influences came 
from outside the Church, while others came from within.  Internal influences were 
numerous and included the rise of personalism within the Catholic Church, the 
influence of high-profile converts to Catholicism such as John Henry Newman, and 
the Papal encyclical Immortale Dei.
110
  These influences have been described in 
some detail by Brett Scharffs and Andrea Pin in a forthcoming article, Freedom for 
All: The Catholic Journey to Religious Freedom and its Global Legacy.
111
 
The influence I would like to emphasize here was that of American Catholics’ 
experiences with religious persecution, and the emphasis on the American 
constitutional experience of separation of religion and the state.  As religious 
freedom of Catholics was protected under the U.S. Constitution,
112
 a new model of 
church-state relations became not only plausible but it reflected certain advantages. 
Some prominent thinkers played an active role in inspiring the drafting of 
Dignitatis Humanae.  Among them stands out John Courtney Murray, an American 
Jesuit priest who was able to articulate a defense of religious freedom with his works 
and advised the Church Fathers during its elaboration.
113
 
Murray gave a twofold contribution: on one hand, he provided the Church 
Fathers with an understanding of freedom that did not contradict the Catholic 
Church’s claim to carry the truth; on the other hand, he was able to articulate a 
narrative of the historical development of the Catholic doctrine of religious freedom 
that avoided frictions between the bold affirmations of Dignitatis Humanae and the 
nineteenth century’s quite different approach to the topic. 
In 1965, while the declaration was in the process, Murray published The 
Problem of Religious Freedom,
114
 a short book that looked at the idea of religious 
freedom from a historical as well as theoretical perspective. 
Historically, Murray did not hide that the Church’s experience of religious 
freedom in the world was multifarious; “perhaps chiefly in Spain, the institution 
[was] alien; the very notion connote[d] a hated Liberalismo, pernicious both to the 
Church and to a cherished national religious unity.”
115
  But the Church could not 
simply ignore its missionary role and the diaspora of Catholics in non-Catholic 
countries.
116
  More precisely, Murray emphasized that religious freedom had been 
“an integral part of the Catholic experience in the United States” from which Vatican 
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II had to take inspiration.
117
  The illuminating examples of the “American 
Constitution (1789) and its Bill of Rights (1791)” had shifted the legal paradigm of 
church and state relations from a “political and legal support of the exclusive rights 




These historical considerations spurred Murray’s theoretical efforts.  He 
proceeded to distinguish between the juridical, the theological, and the ethical 
problem of religious freedom.
119
  He addressed these three layers from two different 
perspectives, which he saw as mutually alternative. 
On one side stood what he called the First View.
120
  This view considered the 
three layers jointly: the only correct exercise of freedom of conscience consisted in 
adhering to truth; an erring conscience could only be tolerated by public powers; and 
in fact, Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius XII both spoke of tolerance.
121
  On the legal 
plane, this meant that “[t]he erroneous conscience ha[d] no right to external social 
freedom.  That is, it ha[d] no right to public expression or manifestation of its beliefs 
in worship, witness, or teaching.  In particular, it ha[d] no right publicly to propagate 
or disseminate its belief.”
122
  Only the true religion had the right to be established as 
it was divinely founded and ordained.
123
 
In Murray’s eyes, this doctrine was not set in stone.  It could be massaged—as 
it had been, since Pope Leo XIII and the Popes who came after him did not explicitly 
endorse the view that public power can legitimately “enforce outward conformity 
with the official faith.”
124
 
With what he called the Second View, Murray built up an intellectual 
alternative from which the Church Fathers later drew.  He considered freedom in 
general “as a political end, along with justice[,]”
125
 within which religious freedom 
enjoyed a special place.
126
  And yet, religious freedom was strictly “a juridical or 
constitutional concept,”
127
 which through the ages had made its way into national 
constitutions.
128
  It was “an affair of the social and civil order; it [was] an immunity 
that attache[d] to the human person within society, and it ha[d] its guarantee in civil 
law.”
129
  The Second View “reject[ed] the opinion that public care of religion 
necessarily mean[t], per se and in principle, a political and legal care for the 
exclusive rights of truth and a consequent care to exterminate religious error.”
130
  
The new intellectual framework that Murray proposed for the political and 
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constitutional spectrum did not justify an inferior treatment for non-Catholic 
religions. 
The Second View’s ramifications were particularly important for the Catholic 
Church’s legal status and fostered an equalitarian treatment of religions on the State 
side.  The Church did not “demand, per se and in principle, a status of legal privilege 
for herself.  The Church demand[ed], in principle and in all situations, religious 
freedom for herself and religious freedom for all men.”
131
 
John Courtney Murray made another crucial distinction, which would bear 
consequences on Vatican II’s reflections.  It drew theoretical and practical lines 
between state and society.
132
  The state was not an omnipotent agent, which was in 
full control of the society itself: the state’s domain was to be found within society, 
not to be identified with itself.
133
 
Drawing the line between state and society laid down the foundation for a 
crucial distinction, namely between public order and the common good.
134
  In 
Murray’s view, the state was not supposed to take care of the common good, but 
only of a part of it, which went under the name of public order.
135
  The common 
good included “all the social goods, spiritual and moral as well as material,” and its 
pursuit “devolve[d] upon society as a whole.”
136




According to Murray, human societies needed to allow the free exercise of the 
freedom of conscience.  “[A] true metaphysic of the human person[,]” according to 
his thinking, considered “human existence [as] essentially social-historical 
existence.”
138
  It was not “permitted to introduce a dichotomy into man, to separate 
his personal-interior existence and his social-historical existence.”
139
  In other words, 
freedom of conscience was not just a business for individuals, but a necessary 
component of social life. 
The statement that a person’s life could not be dichotomized into an interior 
existence and an exterior one was particularly significant, and went hand-in-hand 
with the idea of the state as only protecting public order instead of fostering the 
common good broadly conceived.  By denying the “separation of the personal-moral 
and the social-juridical orders”
140
 and narrowing down the state’s power to preserve 
the public order, Murray posited that the state could not simply stay out of a person’s 




All things considered, for John Courtney Murray, “the state . . . [was] 
competent to do only one thing in respect of religion, that [was], to recognize, 
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guarantee, protect, and promote the religious freedom of the people.”
142
  The public 
power was “not the judge of the truth or falsity of the norms whereby conscience is 
formed.”
143
  The protection of conscience did not end within the internal forum of 
the human soul; no religious truth could receive the state’s blessing.
144
  Religious 




VI.     ISLAM 
The Catholic paradigm shift in matters of religious freedom is a noteworthy 
example of how religious persecution and the experience of a religious minority with 
the constitutional principle of religious freedom may lead a major religious group to 
reevaluate its approach to religious freedom.  One may hope that religious groups 
such as Muslims will follow the Catholic example and become defenders of religious 
freedom.  As previously mentioned, the Catholic Church as an institution has not 
always been an advocate of religious freedom for all.
146
  Dignitatis Humanae shows 
that religions can change, and do so and come to embrace religion in a way that 
positively affects everybody, by reflecting on their own doctrine.
147
 
The paradigm shift of the Catholic Church in regards to religious freedom was 
partially caused by the experiences of persecution of Catholics in America, as well 
as the experience of having their religious freedom recognized and protected.
148
  As 
religious persecution of Muslim groups are on the rise in several places in the world, 
such as Myanmar,
149
 we may ask whether Muslims will reconsider their approach to 
religious freedom in the same way that the Catholic Church has become a strong 
advocate of religious freedom. 
 
 142 Id. at 41. 
 143 Id. at 79. 
 144 See id. 
 145 Id. at 80. 
 146 See supra Part III. 
 147 See supra Part V. 
 148 See supra Part IV. 
 149 See, e.g., Abigail Hauslohner, Discrimination Against Muslims is Increasing in U.S., Pew 
Study Finds, WASH. POST (July 26, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/discrimination-against-muslims-is-increasing-in-us-
pew-study-finds/2017/07/25/dfa52756-717a-11e7-9eac-
d56bd5568db8_story.html?utm_term=.4e0b311e1cd2; Panu Wongcha-um, All Muslims in Burma 
Facing Growing Persecution Amid ‘Massacre’ of Rohingyas, Rights Groups Say, INDEP. (Sept. 5, 
2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/burma-rohingya-muslim-persecution-
massacre-rights-groups-aung-san-suu-kyi-a7929881.html. 
2018] I S L A M  A N D  R E L I G I O U S  F R E E D O M  95 
A.   The Muslim Experience in France 
1.   The French Ban on Face-Covering Veils 
Recent developments in French law show an intent to restrict Muslim religious 
freedom.
150
  For example, “[o]n March 15, 2004, France passed Law No. 2004-228, 
which provides that in public elementary schools, junior high schools and high 
schools, students are prohibited from wearing signs or clothing through which they 
exhibit conspicuously a religious affiliation.”
151
 
“On its face, this law affects all religions equally.  In practice, however, this 
law has most severely impacted Muslim students because it prohibits Muslim 
schoolgirls from wearing headscarves to school.”
152
  A few months after passage of 
the law, the Conseil d’Etat (the French Supreme Court on Administrative Matters) 
upheld its constitutionality.
153
  It found that, “although it infringed on the ‘freedom 
of thought, conscience, and religion,’ the restriction ‘was proportionate to the 
general interest pursued’”—the respect of secularism in public schools.
154
 
Five years later, addressing both houses of French Parliament in a historic 
Versailles venue, French President Nicolas Sarkozy denounced the burqa as a sign 
of subjugation and of debasement that is not welcome on the French territory.
155
  In 
2010, the Law No. 2004-228 was broadened by the passage of the Law No. 2010-
1192, which “banned the burqa and other full-face veils in all public places.”
156
  
“Both the French Assembly and the French Senate overwhelmingly passed the ban, 
which was ultimately approved by the Constitutional Council, France’s top legal 
authority, on October 7, 2010.  The law went into effect on April 11, 2011.”
157
  It 
imposes two types of punishment for the violation of the law against face-covering 
veils: (1) a fine of 150 euros (approximately $190 USD) or a citizenship course for 
a woman who wears a burka in public, and (2) one year in prison and a fine of 




When Law No. 2010-1192 passed, it was challenged in the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR).  In the highly controversial decision S.A.S. v. France, the 
ECtHR upheld the ban.
159
  The court focused on whether the law interfered with the 
 
 150 See Jessica Fourneret, Note, France: Banning Legal Pluralism by Passing a Law, 29 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 233, 235–36 (2006). 
 151 Jennifer Heider, Unveiling the Truth Behind the French Burqa Ban: The Unwarranted 
Restriction of the Right to Freedom of Religion and the European Court of Human Rights, 22 IND. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 93, 94–95 (2012) (citations and quotations omitted). 
 152 Id. at 95. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. (quoting Nicole Atwill, France—Implementation of Law Prohibiting Religious 
Clothing in Public Schools, 12 WORLD L. BULL. 1, 16 (2004)), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/wlb/200412.pdf. 
 155 Id. at 95–96. 
 156 Id. at 96. 
 157 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 158 Id. at 96–97. 
 159 S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014). 
96 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E  [VOL. 93 
rights of the applicant to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression.
160
  
The court confirmed the existence of such a restriction.
161
  But this restriction of the 
rights is required by law, so the question was whether it corresponded to a legitimate 
aim and if the restriction was proportionate to that goal.
162
  Thus, the court examined 
the necessity of the measure.
163
 
The ECtHR upheld the law but not on grounds of public order.
164
  The French 
government failed to demonstrate that the face veil caused a general threat against 
public safety.
165
  However, the court found that the impugned ban could be regarded 
as justified in its principle solely in so far as it sought to guarantee the conditions of 
“living together.”
166
  Consequently, the court concluded that the ban imposed can be 
regarded as proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation of the 
conditions of “living together” as an element of the “protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.”
167
  This has been criticized as an expansion of the legitimate 
bases for limitations on freedom of religion and belief beyond the grounds for 
limitation enumerated in the European Convention on Human Rights.
168
 
2.   The French Supreme Administrative Court’s Denial of Mabchour’s Citizenship 
The ban on face-covering veils in the context of citizenship and immigration 
policies creates further questions.
169
  “On June 27, 2008, the French Supreme 
Administrative Court denied citizenship to Mabchour on the basis of her alleged 
submission to her husband and her lack of integration to French society.”
170
  
However, the woman speaks French fluently and had been living in France with her 
French husband since 2000.
171
  The woman in question appealed to the Council of 
State.
172
  Rejecting her appeal, the council invoked her imperfect integration into 
French society because she had adopted a “radical” practice of her religion that was 
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recognized as a legal right in France or elsewhere”); Hakeem Yusuf, S.A.S. v France: Supporting 
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The judgment did not make any explicit reference to the issue of clothing.
174
  
However, the fact that the plaintiff wore the burqa had been mentioned in a 
submission of the Council of State.
175
  In the submission, an independent female 
magistrate stated that the woman had come to the interview with the government 
authorities fully covered in a robe from the Arabic peninsula and had refused to bare 
her face even in front of female officers for purposes of identification.
176
 
“While it is undisputed that, pursuant to Article 21–4 of the French Civil Code, 
it is within the jurisdiction of the French authorities to deny citizenship based on 
lack of assimilation, this decision mark[ed] a significant evolution in French 
citizenship law . . . .”
177
  It was the first time that French authorities had officially 




By holding that Mabchour’s radical practice of her religion is incompatible with 
the essential values of the French community, the Conseil d’Etat’s ruling 
legitimize[d] the prejudiced assessments by the French authorities as to whether 
applicants’ practice of Islam and its social corollaries conflict with French values 
and amount to a lack of assimilation.
179
 
B.   The Decisions of the European Court of Justice 
The recent cases of Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions
180
 and Bougnaoui v. 
Micropole SA
181
 further developed the caselaw on the protection of religious 
manifestations by Muslims in Europe.  Both Achbita and Bougnaoui dealt with the 
application of the antidiscrimination provision in European Directive 2000/78
182
 
regarding religious expression in the workplace.  In both cases a female Muslim 
employee was fired because of her decision to wear a religious headscarf—Achbita 
in violation of her employer’s written policies
183
 and Bougnaoui because of 
customer preferences not to work with somebody wearing a religious headscarf.
184
  
In Achbita, the court held that the termination was not direct discrimination because 
the policy prohibited the expression of all political, philosophical, and religious signs 
(not just the wearing of religious headscarves), but that it may have amounted to 
 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 166. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 165–66 (citations omitted). 
 178 Id. at 166. 
 179 Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
 180 Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Sols. NV, 2017 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0157 
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indirect discrimination if the neutral policy resulted in “a particular religion or belief 
being put at a particular disadvantage.”
185
  In Bougnaoui, the court found for the 
Muslim woman and held that satisfying customer preferences “cannot be considered 




I have argued that the experience with religious freedom by a religious 
minority can affect how coreligionists view religious freedom in a place where that 
religion is a majority.  The primary example I’ve cited is the experience of Catholics 
in America, which became an important factor in the emergence of the Catholic 
commitment to religious freedom that was manifested in Vatican II.  The experience 
of Muslims in countries where they are a minority, especially in Europe, does not 
bode well for the prospect of European Muslims becoming a force for advocating 
the benefits of religious freedom that will be persuasive to their coreligionists in 
places where Muslims represent a majority.  The experience of Muslims in America 
may provide a more hopeful prospect, but the story here, too, is mixed at best. 
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